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CONFIRMING JUDGES IN THE 2016 SENATE LAME
DUCK SESSION
Carl Tobias ∗
In this piece, Professor Carl Tobias descriptively scrutinizes the nomination and confirmation
regimes throughout the administration of President Barack Obama. The article critically
evaluates selection finding that persistent Republican Senate obstruction resulted in the
greatest number of unoccupied posts for the longest duration, briefly moderated by the 2013
detonation of the “nuclear option,” which constricted filibusters. Nevertheless, the article
contends when the Grand Old Party (GOP) attained a chamber majority, Republicans
dramatically slowed the nomination and confirmation processes after January 2015.
Therefore, openings surpassed ninety before Congress is scheduled to reassemble. Because
this dilemma erodes rapid, inexpensive, and equitable disposition, the article suggests how the
Senate should promptly reduce the multitude of unfilled judgeship once the lame duck session
commences.

Following the prolonged summer recess and Congress’ truncated appearance on Capitol Hill, the politicians departed Washington in September
until November. The protracted absence of Senators permitted merely one
judge’s confirmation after June, leaving the bench with ninety-four empty
seats when members convene in November. Moreover, presidential and
Senate election results will provoke numerous circuit and district judges to
assume senior status or retire, which means that the courts will probably
face 110 vacancies out of 842 lower court judgeships at the 2017 Inauguration Day. Regardless of who captured the presidency and the upper chamber, Democratic and Republican Senators need to cooperate and fill the positions over the lame duck session. Tribunals require their entire
complement of judges for delivering justice, yet presently attempt to resolve massive caseloads with ninety-four vacancies. Appointments in the
congressional session which begins after the elections merit consideration.
The piece descriptively scrutinizes the nomination and confirmation regimes throughout the administration of President Barack Obama. It critically evaluates selection and finds that persistent Republican Senate obstruction resulted in the greatest number of unoccupied posts for the longest
time, which the 2013 detonation of the “nuclear option” that constricted fil∗
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ibusters briefly moderated. Nevertheless, when the Grand Old Party (GOP)
attained a chamber majority, Republicans dramatically slowed the nomination and confirmation processes after January 2015. Therefore, openings
surpassed ninety before Congress is scheduled to reassemble. Because this
dilemma erodes rapid, inexpensive, and equitable disposition, the paper
suggests how the Senate should promptly reduce the multitude of unfilled
judgeships once the lame duck session commences.
I.

OBAMA ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION

At President Obama’s inauguration, the lower federal courts encountered fifty-four vacancies. 1 The administration swiftly ensured careful
nomination for able, centrist, diverse prospects. 2 The White House consulted home state elected officers and aggressively pursued their recommendations of superb, consensus individuals, especially minority, female
and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) picks. 3 Numerous
lawmakers concomitantly adopted special initiatives which could detect,
examine and propose talented, mainstream submissions, notably persons of
color, women and LGBT selections. 4 The White House correspondingly
assembled ideas from conventional outlets, particularly the American Bar
Association (ABA), and less customary sources, encompassing minority,
women’s and LGBT bar groups and politicians familiar with strong candidates. 5 They helped aspirants navigate the pre-nomination system while
tendering multiple fine possibilities. Officials then sent choices and Obama
canvassed them, nominating many.
The Obama White House significantly improved the appointments procedures, 6 comprehensively seeking aid from both parties. 7 Obama engaged
1

2

3

4
5
6
7

Russell Wheeler, Judicial Nomination: Into the Home Stretch, BROOKINGS INST. (2010),
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/judicial-nomination-into-the-home-stretch/; see VACANCIES
IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009).
Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection in Congress’ Lame Duck Session, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52, 53
(2015) citing Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2233, 2239-40 (2013); see also Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s Judiciary at Midterm, 94
JUDICATURE 262 (2011) (explaining that Obama’s nominees were among the most diverse in history).
Tobias, supra note 2, at 53, citing 160 CONG. REC. S5364 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2014) (statement of
Sen. Leahy); Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 18
(2013) (emphasizing Obama’s excellent record of nominating “nontraditional” candidates, such
as women and racial and ethnic minorities); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2239-40.
Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 7, 18; Carl Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51
B.C. L. REV. 769, 777 (2010).
Tobias, supra note 2, at 53. I also rely in this and in the next two sentences on Goldman et al.,
supra note 3; sources supra note 2.
Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24; see sources supra note 2.
Tobias, supra note 2, at 2239 (finding that Obama improved the appointments process by assiduously consulting and by emphasizing competence, ethics and diversity, rather than ideology); Peter Baker & Adam Nagourney, Tight Lid Defined Process in Selecting a New Justice: Using Past

Nov. 2016]

CONFIRMING JUDGES

3

Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), the Judiciary Committee Chair, who
speedily instituted nominee panel hearings and votes; Harry Reid (D-Nev.),
the Majority Leader, who directly controlled the floor; and Chuck Grassley
(Iowa) and Mitch McConnell (Ky.), their Republican analogues. 8 Despite
concerted Democratic endeavors, the GOP failed to reciprocate.9 After
nominations, Leahy swiftly initiated hearings, 10 but the minority party held
over ballots seven days without reasons for excellent prospects whom the
committee unanimously approved the next week. 11 McConnell collaborated little to set final votes, and his colleagues duly placed anonymous holds,
or those with no substantiation, on capable, moderate nominees; this frustrated appointments, mandating cloture. 12 Republicans assertively demanded plentiful, unwarranted roll call ballots and debate time and this
wasted scarce floor hours. 13 Therefore, by fall 2009, circuits wrestled with
twenty, and district courts seventy-five, open positions, which effectively
remained constant over the succeeding half decade, comprising the highest
rate for an unprecedented period. 14 This situation worsened in 2013 when
Obama picked competent, mainstream, diverse aspirants for three D.C. Circuit vacancies. 15 After the GOP rejected yes or no votes for each, the
machinations forced Democrats to cautiously invoke the nuclear option. 16

8

9

10
11

12

13

14
15

16

Battles to Avert Pitfalls, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A1 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/us/politics/28select.html (Obama sought both parties’ assistance by consulting with every Judiciary Committee member from each party).
Senator Grassley replaced Senator Jeff Sessions (Ala.) as Judiciary Committee Ranking Member
in 2011. Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection in Congress’ Lame Duck Session, 90 IND. L.J. SUPP. 52,
53 (2015) citing Tobias, supra note 2, at 2242.
For instance, some politicians slowly tendered names or recommended none. Goldman et al.,
supra note 3, at 17; Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary, 97 JUDICATURE 7,
17 (2013).
Tobias, supra note 2, at 53; Maureen Groppe, No Sparks Fly at Hearing, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
(Apr. 30, 2009), at 3A.
Sessions found that most candidates whom Obama tapped were “fine nominees.” Exec. Business
Mtg., S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (Oct. 8, 2009); Exec. Business Mtg., S. Judiciary Comm.,
111th Cong. (Oct. 15, 2009).
155 CONG. REC. S11, 421 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009); 156 CONG. REC. S820 (daily ed. Feb. 26,
2010); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2246 (providing several examples of how filibusters can devour
scarce resources and prolong vacancies).
The GOP even sought sixty, and used five, minutes for strong choices like Judge Beverly Martin;
she won approval 97-0. 156 CONG. REC. S13, S18 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2010); Doug Kendall, The
Oct.
26,
2009,
http://www.slate.com/art
Bench
in
Purgatory,
SLATE,
icles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2009/10/the_bench_in_purgatory.html.
Archive of Judicial Vacancies (2009-14), supra note 1.
Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President on Nominations to the D.C. Circuit (June 4, 2013); Michael Shear and Jeremy Peters, Judicial Picks Set
Stage for Senate Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 4. 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/us/politics/obamatoname3totopappealscourtinchallengetore
publicans.html.
I rely substantially in this and the next sentence on 159 CONG. REC. S8, 418 (daily ed. Nov. 21,
2013); Toobin, supra note 6; Jeremy Peters, Building a Legacy, Obama Reshapes Appellate
Bench, N.Y. TIMES Sept. 14, 2014,

4
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They marshaled fifty-one, not sixty-seven, ballots when amending the filibuster rule to require a majority vote for cloture. Detonating the nuclear
option essentially allowed Senate majorities to confirm all three D.C. Circuit possibilities and many other circuit and district court nominees. 17 In
2014, Reid emphasized appellate court candidates, arranging cloture and
Senate votes most weeks that the chamber operated. 18 Those actions, especially the nuclear mechanism’s release, permitted the courts of appeals to
confront seven openings, although the districts had thirty-two, when Congress adjourned near 2014’s close. 19
Over 2015, after Republicans had captured a Senate majority, 20 already
negligible coordination further diminished. GOP leaders incessantly
pledged they would again bring to the chamber “regular order,” a phase
employed to describe the approach which Republicans claimed governed
before Democrats ostensibly eroded it. Early in January, McConnell, the
new Majority Leader, urged: “We need to return to regular order.” 21
Grassley, the new Judiciary Chair, vowed he would treat nominations analogously. 22 Despite many promises, Republicans slowly designated choices
for Obama to review, planned nominee hearings and committee ballots, and
scheduled chamber debates and votes. This meant that, by 2015’s conclu-

17

18

19

20

21

22

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/us/politics/building%ADlegacy%ADobama%ADreshapes
%ADappellate%ADbench.html?_r=1.
159 CONG. REC. S8584 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2013); id. at S8667 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2013); 160
CONG. REC. S283 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2014); Todd Ruger, Court Seats Filling Up: Democrats
Push Votes Ahead of Elections, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 11, 2014.
Leahy statement, supra note 3; Burgess Everett, How the Senate reshaped the courts, POLITICO
(Aug. 22, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/08/how-going-nuclear-unclogged-thesenate-110238.
Jeffrey Toobin, Bench Press, NEW YORKER, Sept. 21, 2009, at 42. Appellate court openings were
at their lowest point since 1990. This is particularly striking, because 1990 judgeships legislation
approved 11 new judgeships, bringing the total to 179. Pub. L. No. 101-650, Tit. II, § 206, 104
Stat. 5098 (1990). Partisanship that was formerly confined to Justices has now infected all levels
of the federal judiciary. Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 12-14; Tobias, supra note 2, at 2234-38.
Jerry Markon et al., Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show Dissatisfaction with Obama,
WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-control-at-stake-intodays-midterm-elections/2014/11/04/e882353e-642c-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story.html; Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1.
He repeated the mantra throughout last year and all of 2016. 161 CONG. REC. S27-28 (daily ed.
Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015); see Sarah Binder, Can Mitch McConnell
Repair the Senate?, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/11/12/can-mitch-mcconnellrepair-the-senate/ (explaining the regular order concept). But see 161 CONG. REC. S2949 (daily
ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid) (criticizing the twenty nominations pending in the
Judiciary Committee, and twenty-five judicial emergencies); 162 CONG. REC. S5433 (daily ed.
Sept. 8, 2016) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that Republicans refusal to process Garland
demonstrates the failure to return to regular order).
S. Judiciary Comm., Hearing on Nominees (Jan. 21, 2015); David Catanese, Grassley’s Gavel
Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 28, 2015; Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate leader and
regular order, THE HILL, July 14, 2016, http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/287713the-republican-senate-leader-and-regular-order.
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sion, eight of nine appellate vacancies lacking nominees - which the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts identified as emergencies - plagued
states that GOP members represented. 23 One circuit and ten district jurists
won confirmation last year.
2016 is a presidential election year when judicial appointments conventionally stall and ultimately halt, complications intensified by GOP refusal
to process U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Chief
Judge Merrick Garland, Obama’s accomplished, mainstream High Court
nominee. 24 The Senate approved one circuit and eight trial court jurists before departing to campaign in late September, yet Republicans averaged
only a lone confirmation per month since January 2015 and there could be
110 empty posts on the next Inauguration Day. 25
II.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A. Difficulties
Striking obstruction and rampant partisanship impose harmful effects.
Making superb, moderate nominees wait prolonged times leaves robust careers on hold and dissuades many stellar prospects from contemplating the

23

24

25

For the eight of nine vacancies, see Judicial Vacancies, supra note 1 (2016),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicialvacancies/2016/01/vacancies. Republican Senators cooperated minimally, which prompted
Obama to nominate no candidates across 2015. However, Obama did tap seven nominees in
2016. JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra. Some prospects lack hearings, because home state Senators
retain “blue slips.” E.g., Jonathan Tamari and Jeremy Roebuck, Obama’s Pick for Judgeship
Her Draws Toomey’s Ire, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2016; see Ryan Owens et al., Ideology,
Qualification, and Covert Senate Obstruction of Federal Court Nominations, 2014 U. ILL. L.
REV. 347 (analyzing blue slips). Emergencies reflect substantial docket size and protracted vacancy length. Toobin, supra note 19.
Russell Wheeler, The Thurmond Rule and Other Advice and Consent Myths, BROOKINGS INST.
(May 25, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/05/25/thethurmondruleandotheradviceandconsentm
yths/; Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President Announcing Judge Merrick
Garland as his Nominee to the Supreme Court (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2016/03/16/remarks-president-announcing-judge-merrick-garland-his-nomineesupreme; Michael Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2016, at A1. McConnell has continuously vowed that the next President will fill
this vacancy. Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick Garland
Fight, CNN.COM (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garlandsupreme-court/; Manu Raju, No Confirmation for Garland in Lame Duck Session, CNN.COM
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/merrick-garland-supremecourt/index.html.
JUDICIAL VACANCIES (2015-16), supra note 1; Russell Wheeler, Recess is Over: Time To Confirm Judges, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept.6, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2016/09/06/recess-is-over-time-to-confirm-judges/.
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bench. 26 This resistance deprives tribunals of necessary judicial resources
and myriad litigants of civil and criminal justice, while it undermines swift,
economical and fair case disposition, 27 and public regard for the confirmation system and the coequal branches. 28
B. Benefits
Notwithstanding these problems, Obama’s impressive work and diligent efforts by lawmakers who cooperated with the White House realized
considerable success when they approved numbers of very qualified, moderate, diverse candidates at 2014’s close. For instance, Obama tripled the
Asian American circuit jurists, 29 named the first gay appellate judge, 30 expanded the number of female choices’ represented to more than 40 percent
and increased experiential diversity. 31 This White House reduced openings
to thirty-nine by the end of 2014; however, in November, the bench will
have thirteen circuit, and eighty-one district, vacancies when Congress reconvenes for the lame duck session.32
Assiduous efforts by President Obama and Senators who helped confirm a plethora of talented, diverse nominees, yield advantages. Many circuit and district courts with fewer openings comparatively quickly, inexpensively and equitably resolve immense, complex filings. 33 Enlarged
diversity also improves comprehension and review of essential questions,
notably involving constitutional and criminal law, and experiential diversity can supply those and related benefits. 34 People of color, women and
26
27

28
29

30

31
32
33
34

157 CONG. REC. S6027 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Tobias, supra note 2,
at 2253.
JOHN ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7-8 (2010); Jennifer
Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress Is,
HUFFINGTONPOST (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courtsvacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b.
Tobias, supra note 2, at 2253.
Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, Biographical Directory of Judges,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (2016); This is the First Time Our Judge
HOUSE.GOV
(June
8,
2016),
Pool
Has
Been
So
Diverse,
WHITE
https://www.whitehouse.gov/share/judicial-nominations.
Todd Ruger, Obama Names Record Number of Gay Judges, NAT’L L. J., (July 21, 2014); Mark
Joseph Stern, Obama’s Most Enduring Gay Rights Achievement, SLATE, (June 17, 2014);
Toobin, supra note 6.
President Obama also appointed two female Justices, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan.
Toobin, supra note 6; WHITE HOUSE.GOV, supra note 29.
JUDICIAL VACANCIES, supra note 1 (2016). Insufficient time remains to fill all thirteen appellate
court vacancies in 2016.
When courts have full judicial complements, this relieves overworked judges. Leahy statement,
supra note 3; Tobias, supra note 2, at 2254.
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES (1995); SALLY KENNEY, GENDER AND JUSTICE
(2013); FRANK WU, YELLOW (2003). But see Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011)(finding that gender does not affect judicial decision making).
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LGBT individuals could mitigate ethnic, gender and similar biases that impair justice. 35 Courts that mirror America enhance public confidence.36
In short, the advantages of confirming able, consensus, diverse jurists
eclipse the adverse impacts which can result from politicization and obstruction. Thus, in the lame duck session, both sides need to maximize collaboration that will promote the appointment of numerous such choices and
carefully minimize the detriments which partisanship and obstruction create.
III. SUGGESTIONS
Republicans and Democrats should redouble their efforts to confirm the
largest possible number of trial and circuit judges in the lame duck session. 37 Approving remarkable, consensus, diverse persons affords multiple
benefits. For example, these jurists invariably could help to speedily, economically, and fairly resolve courts’ huge dockets and furnish perceptive
insights on complex fields of litigation.
The GOP may argue the Senate failed to confirm judges after Presidents
captured election in 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2008. 38 However, more telling
was Stephen Breyer’s 1980 circuit appointment once Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter, a process eased by Strom Thurmond, who fashioned
the “rule” providing that approvals can be delayed and stopped in presidential election years. 39 Republicans also should remember that GOP home
state politicians recommended a majority of the twenty well qualified,
mainstream district nominees whom the Judiciary Committee approved by
voice vote without dissent. 40 Republicans as well should keep in mind the
substantial waste entailed in failing to consider these nominees, the huge
amount of time, money, and energy that the government must expend to

35
36
37

38

39
40

REPORT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT GENDER, RACE AND ETHNIC BIAS TASK FORCES (1999); FINAL
REPORT, NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS, AND ETHNIC FAIRNESS (1997).
Sheldon Goldman, A Profile of Carter’s Judicial Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978);
Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Toobin, supra note 6.
Senate confirmation of appellate court nominees is critical, given Senate approval of two circuit
judges in the last two years; three nominees have waited months on floor debates and votes. See
supra notes 23, 25.
These were the final years of two-term Presidents (except for Bush pére), who confronted many
fewer vacancies, and all elected but him were opposition party members. End of presidency legislative matters also assumed precedence. Kelsey Snell, Senate Considers Making a Short PrePOST,
(Sept.
9,
2016)
Election
Session
Even
Shorter,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/09/09/senate-considering-making-ashort-session-even-shorter/.
Carl Tobias, The Transformation of the Thurmond Rule in 2016, 66 EMORY L. J. 2001 (2016);
see supra note 24.
Report Pending Judicial Nominations, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE (Nov. 11, 2016) www.afj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ReportPendingNominees.pdf.
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restart the process 41 and the judgeships could well remain vacant for more
than a year, given numerous other higher priorities, such as creating a government as well as nominating and confirming a new Justice and sixteen
circuit judges. 42
These ideas demonstrate that Republicans should actively cooperate
with Democrats. They ought to alternate final votes on candidates whom
each party mustered while swiftly according them ballots. If the GOP eschews collaboration by, for instance, aggressively “cherry picking” nominees whom Republicans actually submitted, Democrats might protest unanimous consent or assertively recruit GOP centrists to filibuster nominees.43
Activities effectively must begin immediately to facilitate endeavors
when Congress does assemble. Obama should vigorously pursue creative
ideas from resources knowledgeable about strong consensus prospects and
keep assiduously cultivating home state politicians, asking that lawmakers
support people he suggested. 44 Until, and even after, Congress arrives,
both parties’ Judiciary Committee staff may amply review the twenty nominees awaiting hearings. The panel concomitantly ought to set as many
hearings and meetings as possible during the week politicians convene and
conduct the maximum number practicable until adjournment.
When the session commences, legislators must probe nominees’ capability, ethics, and temperament with expeditious committee hearings and
ballots speedily followed by complete, robust floor debates and votes.
More particularly, lawmakers ought to seriously consider reinstituting numerous longstanding traditions. Most pertinent would be scrutinizing
numbers of prominent, moderate, trial level aspirants throughout the lame
duck session, a nuanced custom which modern Presidents and Senates conventionally respected. 45
41

42

43

44

45

For example, President Donald Trump must consult home state politicians, some of whom must
create merit selection commissions or recalibrate existing ones to recommend candidates whom
the politicians suggest to the White House, which must evaluate prospects and nominate. The
Senate must investigate nominees, conduct panel hearings, discussions and votes, and convene
floor debates and votes.
The process is considerably more extensive and time consuming for appellate nominees and even
more so for Supreme Court nominees, whose confirmation processes can essentially suspend
lower court efforts for months.
Examples are Susan Collins (Me.) and Mark Kirk (Ill.). A cherry picking example was Republicans’ offer to vote on three nominees whom they favored and one whom Democrats picked by
skipping two African Americans whom Democrats favored. This provoked Democratic objections to unanimous consent. 162 CONG. REC. S5900 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2016).
Obama also may ask home state politicians to swiftly proffer for the 37 district openings without
nominees excellent consensus picks whom he analyzes expeditiously and nominates when Congress arrives, but they will lack time for 2016 approval, yet could have hearings then and 2017
approval, if re-nominated.
JUDICIAL EMERGENCIES, supra note 1 available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies.
Judith Schaeffer, What’s Good for One Lame Duck Ought to be Good for Another, HUFFINGTON
POST (Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judith-e-schaeffer/whats-good-for-one-
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This year, the President and legislators should especially honor that custom. The district courts desperately need the open slots filled, and the vast
majority of those possibilities received nomination because they are competent, uncontroversial, and diverse, rather than ideological. 46
Another custom to which Senators must adhere would be permitting final ballots on quite a few of these excellent choices before recesses, namely
during Thanksgiving. 47 The politicians also should restore the convention
of proffering abundant deference to home state colleagues and the President, who has meticulously consulted, indulged Senators’ preferences, and
tapped numerous selections whom Republicans designated. 48
The GOP must correspondingly revisit the determination to refuse
many nominees’ floor votes, which has delayed even the most accomplished, noncontroversial, diverse candidates. If Republicans aggressively
continue enforcing this approach, Democrats might again implement rather
dramatic reforms, which occurred earlier when they cautiously jettisoned
anonymous chamber holds placed on nominees and the sixty-vote cloture
proviso. 49 Democrats may even allow final ballots on a number of competent trial judge submissions proposed by GOP lawmakers in exchange for
Republican agreements to have chamber votes on many whom Democrats
favor. 50
In the end, Republicans and Democrats should precisely balance the
competing needs to thoroughly review suggestions and quickly fill myriad
vacancies. Particularly with numerous fine, mainstream individuals availa-

46

47

48
49

50

lame-d_b_782130.html. See Tobias, supra note 39, at 2002 (noting that Strom Thurmond, the
architect of the Thurmond rule, helped facilitate Stephen Breyer’s appellate confirmation); id. at
2005 n.19 (discussing recent situations that seem to demonstrate that lame duck sessions are
more prevalent in mid-term, than presidential, election years).
Robert Carp et al., A First Term Assessment: The Ideology of Barack Obama’s District Court
Appointees, 97 JUDICATURE 128, 136 (2013); Tobias, supra note 2, at 2249. The Judicial Conference recommendation for Congress that it authorize 73 new judgeships was premised on conservative case and workload estimates in empirical data, which show the critical need. U.S. Jud.
Conf., Proceedings 18 (Mar. 10, 2015). See Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th
Cong. (2013) (proposing the creation of additional judgeships for the circuit and district courts).
Excellent, consensus Bush district nominees had expeditious approval, especially at recesses.
Goldman et al., supra note 2, at 281; Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit
Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV.
217, 292 (2012).
Goldman et al., supra note 2, at 16-17; Carl Tobias, Justifying Diversity in the Federal Judiciary,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 283, 296 (2012).
S. Res. 28, 157th Cong., 157 CONG. REC. S296 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011) (adopted) (secret holds);
Everett, supra note 18 (nuclear option). Democrats may even decide to reinstitute the latter rule.
Burgess Everett, Confirmation Battles Are Back, POLITICO, (Sept. 28, 2014), 6:06 PM, updated
7:07 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/senate-confirmation-battles-111402.
Michael Teter, Rethinking Consent: Proposals for Reforming the Judicial Confirmation Process,
73 OHIO ST. L. J. 287, 289, 335 (2012); Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003); Carl Tobias, Fixing Federal Judicial Selection, 65 EMORY L. J.
ONLINE 2051, 2056 (2016).
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ble to fill the many vacancies, this balance should favor expeditious consideration and approval. The Constitution envisions that Senators will
probe nominee ability, character, and temperament. 51 Legislators should,
as the chief executive deftly has, deemphasize ideology, which possesses
minimal relevance for those criteria, 52 and cabin speculation about how jurists would resolve legal issues, because that can erode judicial independence. 53 The GOP also ought to cease delaying nominees essentially for political gain alone, as this could harm them, litigants, jurists, and selection
procedures’ integrity. One salutary remedy for the difficulties would be a
presumption that capable, moderate nominees merit rapid final ballots. 54
CONCLUSION
Obama and Senators cooperating with the President enjoyed success
when they appointed talented, centrist, diverse judges. If Republicans and
Democrats recalibrate the process by cooperating again over the lame duck
session, they can confirm numbers of these jurists, felicitously enabling the
bench to more promptly, inexpensively, and fairly treat cases.
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U.S. CONST., art. 2; The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process: Hearings Before the S.
Judiciary Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight & the Courts, 107th Cong. 5-7, 262-64 (2001).
See Carp, supra note 46, at 136; Goldman et al., supra note 3, at 18. See generally, STEFANIE
LINDQUIST & FRANK CROSS, MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2009) (attempting an empirical
analysis of judicial activism).
THOMAS SARGENTICH ET AL., CITIZENS FOR INDEP. CTS., UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND
AMERICA’S COURTS 1-75, 121-205 (2000);Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 337-338 (1999).
For instance, ten Republican Senators agreed to cloture on Judge David Hamilton, but nine voted
against confirmation. 155 CONG. REC. S11,421 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2009) (cloture); id. at
S11,552 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2009) (approval). For many other ideas for improvement, see
Shenkman, supra note 47, at 298-311; Tobias, supra note 2, at 2255-65.

